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Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets

Author

Listed:
  • V.V. Chari
  • Ali Shourideh
  • Ariel Zetlin-Jones

Abstract

Banks and financial intermediaries that originate loans often sell some of these loans or securitize them in secondary loan markets and hold on to others. New issuances in such secondary markets collapse abruptly on occasion, typically when collateral values used to secure the underlying loans fall. These collapses are viewed by policymakers as signs that the market is not functioning efficiently. In this paper, we develop a dynamic adverse selection model in which small reductions in collateral values can generate abrupt inefficient collapses in new issuances in the secondary loan market. In our model, reductions in collateral values worsen the adverse selection problem and induce some potential sellers to hold on to their loans. Reputational incentives induce a large fraction of potential sellers to hold on to their loans rather than sell them in the secondary market. We find that a variety of policies that have been proposed during the recent crisis to remedy market inefficiencies do not help resolve the adverse selection problem.

Suggested Citation

  • V.V. Chari & Ali Shourideh & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets," NBER Working Papers 16080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16080
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ariel Zetlin-Jones & Ali Shourideh & V. V. Chari, 2009. "Moral Hazard, Reputation, and Fragility in Credit Markets," 2009 Meeting Papers 806, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Glosten, Lawrence R. & Milgrom, Paul R., 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 71-100, March.
    3. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    4. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, 1999. "A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, January.
    5. Nicolae Gârleanu, 2004. "Adverse Selection and the Required Return," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 643-665.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2018. "Markets with Multidimensional Private Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 250-274, May.
    2. Kawai, Keiichi, 2015. "Reputation for quality and adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 47-59.
    3. Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas, 2013. "TFP during a credit crunch," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1150-1178.
    4. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Chabakauri, Georgy & Nyborg, Kjell G., 2011. "Securitized lending, asymmetric information, and financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43166, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Vladimir Asriyan & William Fuchs & Brett Green, 2019. "Liquidity Sentiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3813-3848, November.
    6. Camargo, Braz & Lester, Benjamin, 2014. "Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 534-568.
    7. Kyungmin Kim & Benjamin Lester & Braz Camargo, 2012. "Subsidizing Price Discovery," 2012 Meeting Papers 338, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Ugo Albertazzi & Ginette Eramo & Leonardo Gambacorta & Carmelo Salleo, 2011. "Securitization is not that evil after all," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 796, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Moore, John, 2013. "Contagious Illiquidity I: Contagion through Time," SIRE Discussion Papers 2013-73, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    10. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Georgy Chabakauri & Kjell G. Nyborg, 2012. "Securitized Banking, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Crisis: Regulating Systemic Risk Away," FMG Discussion Papers dp704, Financial Markets Group.
    11. Albertazzi, Ugo & Eramo, Ginette & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Salleo, Carmelo, 2015. "Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 33-49.
    12. House, Christopher L. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2015. "Managing markets for toxic assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 84-99.
    13. Ugo Albertazzi & Margherita Bottero & Leonardo Gambacorta & Steven Ongena, 2016. "Asymmetric information and the securitization of SME loans," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1091, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    14. Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2014. "Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 1875-1908, July.
    15. Ramon Marimon & Gaetano Gaballo, 2014. "Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing: Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies," 2014 Meeting Papers 1077, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Hajime Tomura, 2012. "Asset Illiquidity and Market Shutdowns in Competitive Equilibrium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(3), pages 283-294, July.
    17. Choi, Michael, 2018. "Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 619-649.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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