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Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality

Author

Listed:
  • Veronica Guerrieri
  • Robert Shimer

Abstract

We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection. There exists a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets trade at higher prices but with a lower price-dividend ratio in less liquid markets. Sellers of high-quality assets signal quality by accepting a lower trading probability. We show how the distribution of sellers' private information affects an asset's price and liquidity, how a change in that distribution can cause a fire sale and a flight to quality, and how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the flight to quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Veronica Guerrieri & Robert Shimer, 2014. "Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity, Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 1875-1908, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:7:p:1875-1908
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.7.1875
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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