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Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing: Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Ramon Marimon

    (European University Institute)

  • Gaetano Gaballo

    (Banque de France)

Abstract

We analyze an economy where banks are uncertain about firms' investment opportunities and, as a result, credit tightness can result in excessive risk-taking. In the competitive credit market, banks announce credit contracts and firms apply to them, as in a directed search model. We show that high-risk Self-Confirming Equilibria, with misperceptions, coexist with a low-risk Rational Expectations Equilibrium, in this competitive search economy. Lowering the Central Bank policy rate may not be effective, while a credit-easing policy can be an effective experiment, breaking the high-risk (low-credit) Self-Confirming Equilibrium. We emphasize the differences with a model of Self-Fulfilling credit freezes and the social value of experimentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramon Marimon & Gaetano Gaballo, 2014. "Breaking the Spell with Credit-Easing: Self-Confirming Credit Crises in Competitive Search Economies," 2014 Meeting Papers 1077, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed014:1077
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    References listed on IDEAS

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