IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/43166.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Securitized lending, asymmetric information, and financial crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto
  • Chabakauri, Georgy
  • Nyborg, Kjell G.

Abstract

We develop a model of securitized (Originate, then Distribute) lending in which both publicly observed aggregate shocks to values of securitized loan portfolios, and later asymmetrically observed discernment of the qualities of subsets thereof, play crucial roles, as in the recent paper of Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2010). Unlike in their framework, we find that originators and potential buyers of such assets may differ in their preferences over timing of trades, leading to a reduction in the aggregate surplus accruing from securitization. In addition, heterogeneity in agents’ selected timing of trades – arising from differences in their ex ante beliefs - coupled with high leverage, may lead to financial crises, implying uncoordinated asset liquidations inconsistent with overall (inter-temporal) market equilibrium. We consider and contrast mitigating regulatory policies, such as leverage restrictions and corresponding ex ante resale price guarantees on securitized asset portfolios. We show that the latter performs strictly better than the former, by ensuring not only bank survival, but also enhancing the social surplus arising from securitized lending, in a better coordinated equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Chabakauri, Georgy & Nyborg, Kjell G., 2011. "Securitized lending, asymmetric information, and financial crisis," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43166, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:43166
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43166/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    2. Heider, F. & Hoerova, M. & Holthausen, C., 2009. "Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads : The Role of Counterparty Risk," Discussion Paper 2009-40 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Adrian, T. & Shin, H S., 2009. "The shadow banking system: implications for fi nancial regulation," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 13, pages 1-10, September.
    4. Chris Downing & Dwight Jaffee, 2009. "Is the Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities a Market for Lemons?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2257-2294, July.
    5. V.V. Chari & Ali Shourideh & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2010. "Adverse Selection, Reputation and Sudden Collapses in Secondary Loan Markets," NBER Working Papers 16080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2012. "Dynamic Debt Runs," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1799-1843.
    7. Viral V. Acharya & Hyun Song Shin & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011. "Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2166-2205.
    8. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1995. "A welfare comparison of intermediaries and financial markets in Germany and the US," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 179-209, February.
    9. HyunSong Shin, 2009. "Securitisation and Financial Stability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(536), pages 309-332, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Chabakauri, Georgy & Nyborg, Kjell, 2012. "Securitized banking, asymmetric information, and financial crisis: regulating systemic risk away," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119049, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. S. Gabrieli & C.-P. Georg, 2014. "A network view on interbank market freezes," Working papers 531, Banque de France.
    3. Hajime Tomura, 2012. "Asset Illiquidity and Market Shutdowns in Competitive Equilibrium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(3), pages 283-294, July.
    4. , & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2013. "Liquidity hoarding," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    5. Acharya, Viral V. & Skeie, David, 2011. "A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(5), pages 436-447.
    6. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2013. "Securitization," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1-70, Elsevier.
    7. Haoyang Liu & Zhaogang Song & James Vickery, 2021. "Defragmenting Markets: Evidence from Agency MBS," Staff Reports 965, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Kuncl, Martin, 2019. "Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
    9. Loriano Mancini & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2016. "The Euro Interbank Repo Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1747-1779.
    10. Frank Schmielewski, 2012. "Leveraging and risk taking within the German banking system: Evidence of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008," Working Paper Series in Economics 229, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    11. Martin, Antoine & Skeie, David & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2014. "The fragility of short-term secured funding markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 15-42.
    12. Hodula, Martin & Melecky, Ales & Machacek, Martin, 2020. "Off the radar: Factors behind the growth of shadow banking in Europe," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(3).
    13. Michael Diemer & Uwe Vollmer, 2015. "What makes banking crisis resolution difficult? Lessons from Japan and the Nordic Countries," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 251-277, December.
    14. Beck, Thorsten & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay, 2016. "Financial Regulation in Europe: Foundations and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 11147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2009. "Interbank Lending, Credit-Risk Premia, and Collateral," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(4), pages 5-43, December.
    16. Angelo Baglioni, 2012. "Liquidity Crunch in the Interbank Market: Is it Credit or Liquidity Risk, or Both?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 1-18, April.
    17. Uddin, Md Hamid & Mollah, Sabur & Ali, Md Hakim, 2020. "Does cyber tech spending matter for bank stability?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    18. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2010. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_42, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    19. Michiel Bijlsma & Wim Suyker, 2008. "The credit crisis and the Dutch economy... in eight frequently asked questions," CPB Memorandum 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    20. Michiel Bijlsma & Jeroen Klomp & Sijmen Duineveld, 2010. "Systemic risk in the financial sector; a review and synthesis," CPB Document 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:43166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.