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A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in inter-bank markets

  • Viral V. Acharya
  • David Skeie

Financial crises are associated with reduced volumes and extreme levels of rates for term inter-bank loans, reflected in the one-month and three-month Libor. We explain such stress by modeling leveraged banks’ precautionary demand for liquidity. Asset shocks impair a bank’s ability to roll over debt because of agency problems associated with high leverage. In turn, banks hoard liquidity and decrease term lending as their rollover risk increases over the term of the loan. High levels of short-term leverage and illiquidity of assets lead to low volumes and high rates for term borrowing. In extremis, inter-bank markets can completely freeze.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 498.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:498
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  1. Donaldson, R. Glen, 1992. "Costly liquidation, interbank trade, bank runs and panics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 59-82, March.
  2. Xavier Freixas, 2005. "Interbank Market Integration under Asymmetric Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(2), pages 459-490.
  3. Viral V. Acharya & Ouarda Merrouche, 2010. "Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Inter-Bank Markets: Evidence from the Sub-prime Crisis," NBER Working Papers 16395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Skeie, David R., 2008. "Banking with nominal deposits and inside money," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 562-584, October.
  5. Heider, F. & Hoerova, M. & Holthausen, C., 2009. "Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads : The Role of Counterparty Risk," Discussion Paper 2009-40 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011. "Liquidity hoarding," Staff Reports 488, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  7. Viral V. Acharya & Douglas Gale & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011. "Rollover Risk and Market Freezes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(4), pages 1177-1209, 08.
  8. Xavier Freixas & Antoine Martin & David Skeie, 2011. "Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2656-2692.
  9. Viral V. Acharya & Hyun Song Shin & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2011. "Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 2166-2205.
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  19. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 709-37, August.
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  23. Acharya, Viral V & Gromb, Denis & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2008. "Imperfect Competition in the Inter-Bank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 6984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  33. Gara Afonso & Anna Kovner & Antoinette Schoar, 2010. "Stressed not Frozen: The Fed Funds Market in the Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15806, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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