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Bank Underwriting of Debt Securities: Modern Evidence

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  • Gande, Amar, et al

Abstract

This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to those underwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certification effects for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firms to whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (lower yields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even when an issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring a relatively larger proportion of small issues to the market. Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availability of finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefit small firms. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gande, Amar, et al, 1997. "Bank Underwriting of Debt Securities: Modern Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(4), pages 1175-1202.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:10:y:1997:i:4:p:1175-1202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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