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The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution

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  • Stanley L. Winer

Abstract

In this chapter I provide an overview of the political economy of taxation in democratic states by considering the three most important issues in the field: (1) the evolution of the power to tax in (what are now) the mature constitutional democracies; (2) the nature and determinants of modern tax structures; and (3) redistribution in pluralistic societies over various horizons and in the face of economic shocks. The discussion considers the ideas and models that have arisen as scholars have grappled with these related issues, and points to some of the outstanding problems that may be worth pursuing in future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley L. Winer, 2016. "The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 6252, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6252
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation; Oxford Handbook; political economy; public choice; power to tax; tax structure; fiscal redistribution;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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