Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs
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- Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2003. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 99-124, October.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mogens Justesen & Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013.
"Institutional interactions and economic growth: the joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital,"
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More about this item
KeywordsPolitical transaction costs; Constitutionalism; Political institutions; Division of power; Quality of political decision-making;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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