Interest Groups, Referenda, and the Political Process: On the Efficiency of Direct Democracy
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Noam, Eli M, 1980. "The Efficiency of Direct Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(4), pages 803-810, August.
- Frey, Bruno S & Stutzer, Alois, 2000.
"Happiness, Economy and Institutions,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 918-938, October.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," IEW - Working Papers 015, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 2000. "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 246, CESifo Group Munich.
- Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
- Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 40(159), pages 291-298, August.
- Bruno S. Frey & Marcel Kucher & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Outcome, Process & Power in Direct Democracy," IEW - Working Papers 025, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Blomberg, S. Brock & Hess, Gregory D. & Weerapana, Akila, 2004.
"The impact of voter initiatives on economic activity,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 207-226, March.
- Blomberg, S.B. & Hess, G.D., 1999. "The Impact of Voter Initiatives on Economic Activity," Papers 99-11, Wellesley College - Department of Economics.
- Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 341-354.
- Pommerehne, Werner W., 1990. "The empirical relevance of comparative institutional analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 458-469, May.
- Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
- Peter Moser, 1996. "Why is Swiss Politics so Stable?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 132(I), pages 31-61, March.
- Cusack, Thomas R., 1999. "The Shaping of Popular Satisfaction with Government and Regime Performance in Germany," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(04), pages 641-672, September.
- Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-538.
- Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andreas Arnauld & Klaus Zimmermann, 2013.
"Regulating government (’s share): the fifty-percent rule of the federal constitutional court in Germany,"
European Journal of Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-19, February.
- Andreas, von Arnauld & Zimmermann, Klaus W., 2010. "Regulating Government (´s Share): The Fifty-Percent Rule of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany," Working Paper 100/2010, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
- Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2003.
"Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs,"
Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 99-124, October.
- Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2002. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Ratio Working Papers 3, The Ratio Institute.
- Daniel Horgos & Klaus W. Zimmermann, 2010.
"It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 383-399, August.
- Horgos, Daniel & Zimmermann, Klaus W., 2009. "It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle," Working Paper 98/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:2:p:147-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.