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Brauchen wir einen Schleier der Unkenntnis?

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  • Müller Christian

Abstract

John Rawls’ and James Buchanan’s social contract theories maintain that rational actors, under a thick veil of ignorance/uncertainty, will always take unanimous and fair decisions. In sharp contrast to this received opinion the author shows, by means of a simple model, that - if the social contract is threatened by a prisoner’s dilemma incentive structure - players under uncertainty will not necessarily consent on a „fair“ rather than a discriminatory rule and that they may even fail to agree at all. On the other hand, absent a veil of ignorance/uncertainty a fair consensus will always be the iterated dominance equilibrium in the game of rule choice. The question is raised why, nevertheless, in reality we often have so much trouble to come to a consensus and why we intuitively feel that we need a veil of ignorance/uncertainty for making decisions on rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Müller Christian, 1999. "Brauchen wir einen Schleier der Unkenntnis?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 50(1), pages 207-232, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:50:y:1999:i:1:p:207-232:n:16
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-1999-0116
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    1. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-233, March.
    2. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325, Enero-Abr.
    3. Viktor Vanberg & James M. Buchanan, 1989. "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 49-62, January.
    4. Thomas C. Schelling, 1973. "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(3), pages 381-428, September.
    5. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    6. IAIN McLEAN, 1981. "The Social Contract In Leviathan And The Prisoner'S Dilemma Supergame," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 29(3), pages 339-351, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lenger Alexander & Goldschmidt Nils, 2011. "Ordnungsökonomik als angewandte Wissenschaft. Zur notwendigen Zusammenführung von Theorie und Praxis / Constitutional Economics as an Applied Social Science. About the Essential Combination of Theory ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 343-364, January.
    2. Schreyögg, Jonas, 2003. "Gerechtigkeit in Gesundheitssystemen aus ökonomischer Perspektive," Discussion Papers 2003/12, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.

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