Efficiency in strategic form games: A little trust can go a long way
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More about this item
KeywordsRedistribution; Efficiency; Social contract;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-GTH-2013-07-28 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-07-28 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-07-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-07-28 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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