Inducing Cooperation by Self-Stipulated Penalties
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Efficiency in strategic form games: A little trust can go a long way," Discussion Papers 13/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
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More about this item
Keywords
Penalty for defection; Prisoner¡¯s dilemma; Subgame-perfect equilibrium.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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