Inducing Cooperation by Self-Stipulated Penalties
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Efficiency in strategic form games: A little trust can go a long way," Discussion Papers 13/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
More about this item
KeywordsPenalty for defection; Prisoner¡¯s dilemma; Subgame-perfect equilibrium.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2008:v:9:i:2:p:385-395. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Qiang Gao). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/emcufcn.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.