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Fairness in Urban Land Use: An Evolutionary Contribution to Law & Economics

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  • Christian Schubert

Abstract

Markets for complex, multi-faceted goods normally require a complex institutional framework to function properly, i.e., to lead to patterns of outcomes that are deemed acceptable by the individuals involved. This paper examines the institutional underpinnings of the market for urban land use rights, taking both German and U.S. public and private land use law as a case in point. Apart from efficiency considerations that have been discussed in the literature, the individuals' preferences regarding the fairness of (i) the contents of urban land use rights and (ii) the distribution of costs and benefits induced by innovative land uses have been largely neglected. It is argued that investigating the impact of these preferences (and the underlying informal fairness norms) on the legal treatment of land use rights provides a key opportunity to construct an alternative Law & Economics approach that is compatible with an evolutionary perspective on economic land use decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Schubert, 2006. "Fairness in Urban Land Use: An Evolutionary Contribution to Law & Economics," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-22, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2005-22
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    externalities; takings; land use law; distributive fairness; procedural fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns

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