IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v183y2020i3d10.1007_s11127-020-00795-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: political economy for democratic society

Author

Listed:
  • Viktor J. Vanberg

    (Walter Eucken Institut)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to support three claims. Firstly, that it is Buchanan’s uncompromising commitment to a methodological and a normative individualism to which his lifework owes its coherence and internal consistency. Secondly, that a principal motivating force behind his life-long research efforts has been the aim of inquiring into how the citizen-members of a democratic polity may govern themselves in mutually beneficial ways. And, thirdly, that his contractarian constitutionalism provides a paradigmatic alternative to received outlooks of liberalism, welfare economics, and democratic theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Viktor J. Vanberg, 2020. "J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism: political economy for democratic society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 339-370, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00795-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-020-00795-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-020-00795-5
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-020-00795-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Buchanan, 1995. "The metamorphosis of John Gray," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 293-295, October.
    2. James Buchanan, 1993. "How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-6, December.
    3. Buchanan, James M., 1976. "Taxation in fiscal exchange," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 17-29.
    4. Richard Abel Musgrave, 1939. "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 53(2), pages 213-237.
    5. Warren J. Samuels, 1976. "The Myths of Liberty and the Realities of the Corporate State: A Review Article," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 923-942, December.
    6. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 23-49, June.
    7. James M. Buchanan, 1954. "Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 114-114.
    8. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2007. "Democracy, Citizen Sovereignty and Constitutional Economics," Chapters, in: José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (ed.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. von Mises, Ludwig, 1985. "Liberalism in the Classical Tradition," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number mises1985.
    10. Peter Boettke & Alain Marciano, 2015. "The past, present and future of Virginia Political Economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 53-65, April.
    11. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    12. Knut Wicksell, 1958. "A New Principle of Just Taxation," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 72-118, Palgrave Macmillan.
    13. Phillip W. Magness & Art Carden & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "James M. Buchanan and the Political Economy of Desegregation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 715-741, January.
    14. José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (ed.), 2007. "Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12578.
    15. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James, 1983. "Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 89-105, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alan Hamlin, 2023. "The rule of rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 231-250, June.
    2. Mingyu Liu, 2024. "Structural and functional analysis of Buchanan’s constitutional contract," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, December.
    3. Peter Zweifel, 2020. "The COVID‐19 crisis: A public choice view," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 395-405, October.
    4. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "James M. Buchanan centennial birthday academic conference: an introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 223-226, June.
    5. Christoph March & Ina Schieferdecker, 2021. "Technological Sovereignty as Ability, Not Autarky," CESifo Working Paper Series 9139, CESifo.
    6. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2022. "The Economic Tradition and the Problem of Social Order: Hans Albert’s Critique of Welfare Economics and the Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 83-111, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Viktor Vanberg, 2014. "James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 18-38, March.
    2. Viktor Vanberg, 2011. "Liberal constitutionalism, constitutional liberalism and democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-20, March.
    3. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2016. "Social contract vs. invisible hand: Agreeing to solve social dilemmas," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 16/04, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    4. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2010. "Competition among governments: The state's two roles in a globalized world," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 10/2, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    5. Beatrice Cherrier & Jean-Baptiste Fleury, 2017. "Economists’ interest in collective decision after World War II: a history," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(1), pages 23-44, July.
    6. Eusepi, Giuseppe, 2006. "Public finance and welfare: From the ignorance of the veil to the veil of ignorance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 460-477, April.
    7. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2015. "Constitutional political economy," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 15/06, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    8. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2023. "Liberalism and democracy: legitimacy and institutional expediency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 251-268, June.
    9. Lars P. Feld & Ekkehard A. Köhler, 2023. "Standing on the shoulders of giants or science? Lessons from ordoliberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 197-211, June.
    10. Lenger Alexander & Goldschmidt Nils, 2011. "Ordnungsökonomik als angewandte Wissenschaft. Zur notwendigen Zusammenführung von Theorie und Praxis / Constitutional Economics as an Applied Social Science. About the Essential Combination of Theory ," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 343-364, January.
    11. Silvestri, Paolo, 2015. "Anthropology of Freedom and Tax Justice: Between Exchange and Gift. Thoughts for an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201534, University of Turin.
    12. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2008. "A European social model of state-market relations: the ethics of competition from a neo-liberal perspective," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 08/9, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    13. Pies, Ingo, 2004. "Wirtschaftsethik als Beitrag zur Ordnungspolitik: Ein interdisziplinäres Forschungsprogramm demokratischer Politikberatung," Discussion Papers 2004-5, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    14. Bernd Hansjürgens, 2000. "The Influence of Knut Wicksell on Richard Musgrave and James Buchanan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1), pages 95-116, April.
    15. James M. Buchanan, 1995. "Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(2), pages 141-150, April.
    16. Hansjürgens, Bernd & Schröter-Schlaack, Christoph & Berghöfer, Augustin & Lienhoop, Nele, 2017. "Justifying social values of nature: Economic reasoning beyond self-interested preferences," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 9-17.
    17. Viktor J. Vanberg, 2009. "Evolving Preferences and Policy Advice in Democratic Society," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-19, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    18. Alain Marciano, 2023. "The Political Economy of Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma," Springer Books, in: Martin A. Leroch & Florian Rupp (ed.), Power and Responsibility, pages 345-357, Springer.
    19. Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, 2014. "On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14004, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    20. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2014. "The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 2-17, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutionalism; Contractarianism; Democracy; Individualism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-020-00795-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.