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Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conflict

  • Rohner, D.

Empirical studies have found ethnic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict. Surprisingly, theoretical research on ethnic con.ict has been very scarce. In the present contribution a theoretical model of reputation and ethnic conflict is built. Depending on the information structure and the reputation cost of defecting, economic interaction can either result in (peaceful) trade or in appropriative conflict. Ethnic divisions affect the reputation cost of defection and therefore influence the conflict risk. It is shown what respective effects ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation and segregation have on the risk of conflict.

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File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0658.pdf
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Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0658.

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Length: 29
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0658
Note: Ec
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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