IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to follow this author

Roger D. Congleton

This is information that was supplied by Roger Congleton in registering through RePEc. If you are Roger D. Congleton , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name:Roger
Middle Name:D.
Last Name:Congleton
RePEc Short-ID:pco300
Postal Address:
Location: Morgantown, West Virginia (United States)
Phone: (304) 293-7859
Fax: (304) 293-2233
Postal: P.O. Box 6025, Morgantown, WV 26506-6025
Handle: RePEc:edi:dewvuus (more details at EDIRC)
Location: Fairfax, Virginia (United States)
Phone: (703) 993-2330
Fax: (703) 993 2323
Postal: 4400 University Drive, MS 1D3, Fairfax, VA 22030-4444
Handle: RePEc:edi:csjgmus (more details at EDIRC)
Location: Fairfax, Virginia (United States)
Phone: (703) 993-1151
Fax: 703.993.1133
Postal: Enterprise Hall, Room 354, 4400 University Drive, 3G4 Fairfax, VA 22030
Handle: RePEc:edi:edgmuus (more details at EDIRC)
in new window

  1. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  2. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "The Logic of Collective Action and Beyond," Working Papers 15-23, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  3. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Political Economy of Privacy: Information Sharing between Friends and Foes," Working Papers 15-21, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  4. Roger D. Congleton & Dongwoo Yoo, 2015. "Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis," Working Papers 15-27, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  5. Congleton, Roger D. & Yoo, Dongwoo, 2014. "A Test of the Unraveling Hypothesis: Constitutional Bargaining and the Quality of African Institutions," CEI Working Paper Series 2014-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "The Contractarian Constitutional Political Economy of James Buchanan," Working Papers 13-08, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  7. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "On the Inevitability of Divided Government and Improbability of a Complete Separation of Powers," Working Papers 13-04, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  8. Congleton, Roger D., 2011. "Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?," CIW Discussion Papers 6/2011, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  9. Roger D. Congleton, 2010. "On the Evolution of Organizational Government," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2010-09, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
  10. Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  11. Congleton, Roger D., 1995. "Return to Rio: Agency problems and the political economy of environmental treaties," Discussion Papers, Series II 261, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  1. Roger Congleton, 2015. "Thanks to Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 229-233, March.
  2. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
  3. Roger Congleton, 2013. "On the inevitability of divided government and improbability of a complete separation of powers," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 177-198, September.
  4. Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang, 2013. "Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 108-124, June.
  5. Roger Congleton & Stefan Voigt, 2013. "On the editorial transition," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 1-1, March.
  6. Roger Congleton, 2012. "Growing up with The Calculus of Consent," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 273-278, September.
  7. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
  8. Roger Congleton, 2012. "On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 399-423, March.
  9. Roger Congleton, 2011. "Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 187-207, October.
  10. Roger Congleton, 2010. "Dennis C. Mueller: Reason, religion, and liberal democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 585-587, December.
  11. Roger Congleton, 2010. "Thoughts on Daniel Shapiro's “Is the welfare state justified?”," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 103-105, March.
  12. Roger Congleton & Feler Bose, 2010. "The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 535-555, September.
  13. Congleton, Roger D. & Lee, Sanghack, 2009. "Efficient mercantilism? Revenue-maximizing monopoly policies as Ramsey taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 102-114, March.
  14. Roger Congleton, 2009. "On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 287-317, September.
  15. Roger Congleton, 2008. "America’s neglected debt to the Dutch, an institutional perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 35-59, March.
  16. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
  17. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 509-511, September.
  18. Roger Congleton, 2007. "On the Feasibility of a Liberal Welfare State: Agency and Exit Costs in Income Security Clubs," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 145-159, September.
  19. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 499-501, December.
  20. Congleton, Roger D., 2007. "From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 261-284, June.
  21. Roger Congleton, 2006. "International Public Goods and Agency Problems in Treaty Organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 319-336, December.
  22. Roger Congleton, 2006. "The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 5-30, April.
  23. Roger D. Congleton, 2004. "Mutual Advantages of Coercion and Exit within Private Clubs and Treaty Organizations: Towards a Logic of Voluntary Association," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 94(4), pages 49-78, July-Augu.
  24. Roger Congleton, 2004. "Economic Development and Democracy. Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Suffrage?," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 283-314.
  25. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
  26. Roger Congleton & Andreas Kyriacou & Jordi Bacaria, 2003. "A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 167-190, September.
  27. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90|GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95|GBP 20.95 (paper)," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 145-147.
  28. Roger D. Congleton, 2002. "Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 456-476, September.
  29. Congleton, Roger D, 2001. " Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 35-64, April.
  30. Roger Congleton, 2001. "On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 193-215, September.
  31. Roger D. Congleton, 2001. "In Defense of Ignorance: On the Significance of a Neglected Form of Incomplete Information," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 391-407, Fall.
  32. Congleton, Roger D. & Vanberg, Viktor J., 2001. "Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-167, February.
  33. Congleton, Roger D. & Tollison, Robert D., 1999. "The stability inducing propensities of very unstable coalitions: avoiding the downward spiral of majoritarian rent-seeking," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 193-205, June.
  34. Congleton, Roger D & Steunenberg, Bernard, 1998. " Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(3-4), pages 287-305, June.
  35. Congleton, Roger D, 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 485-505.
  36. Congleton, Roger D. & Fudulu, Paul, 1996. "On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 133-136, July.
  37. Congleton, Roger D & Bennett, Randall W, 1995. " On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 84(1-2), pages 1-24, July.
  38. Buchanan, James M & Congleton, Roger D, 1994. " The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 47-60, April.
  39. Congleton, Roger D, 1992. "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 412-21, August.
  40. Congleton, Roger D & Sweetser, Wendell, 1992. " Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 1-19, January.
  41. Congleton, Roger D, 1991. " Information, Special Interests, and Single-Issue Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 39-49, February.
  42. Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-86, February.
  43. Congleton, Roger D., 1991. "The economic role of a work ethic," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 365-385, May.
  44. Congleton, Roger D & Shughart, William F, II, 1990. "The Growth of Social Security: Electoral Push or Political Pull?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 109-32, January.
  45. Roger D. Congleton, 1989. "Monitoring Rent-Seeking Managers: Advantages of Diffuse Ownership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 662-72, August.
  46. Congleton, Roger D., 1989. "Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 175-190, March.
  47. Roger Congleton, 1989. "Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 101-118, August.
  48. Roger Congleton, 1988. "Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 181-184, February.
  49. Roger Congleton, 1986. "Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 249-263, January.
  50. Congleton, Roger D., 1984. "Committees and rent-seeking effort," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 197-209, November.
  51. Robert Blewett & Roger Congleton, 1983. "Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 441-448, January.
  52. R. Congleton, 1982. "A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 421-425, January.
  53. James Buchanan & Roger Congleton, 1979. "Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 217-230, June.
  1. Roger D. Congleton, 2013. "Early Spanish liberalism and constitutional political economy: the Cádiz Constitution of 1812," Chapters, in: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 4, pages 47-67 Edward Elgar.
  2. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Feler Bose & Youngshin Kim & Rinaldo Pietrantonio, 2013. "Public choice and the modern welfare state," Chapters, in: The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, chapter 22, pages 362-381 Edward Elgar.
  3. Roger D. Congleton, 2007. "Informational Limits to Public Policy: Ignorance and the Jury Theorem," Chapters, in: Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy, chapter 12 Edward Elgar.
  4. Roger D. Congleton, 2006. "Asymmetric Federalism and the Political Economy of Decentralization," Chapters, in: Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 5 Edward Elgar.
  5. Roger D. Congleton, 2001. "The politics of government growth," Chapters, in: The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, chapter 22 Edward Elgar.
  1. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2015. "Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar, number 15325.
  2. Congleton,Roger D., 2011. "Perfecting Parliament," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521764605, 1.
  3. Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg (ed.), 2006. "Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033496, June.
  4. Robert D. Tollison & Roger D. Congleton (ed.), 0. "The Economic Analysis Of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar, number 592.
10 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-AFR: Africa (2) 2014-08-28 2015-10-17
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2011-10-09
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2010-08-14 2014-08-16
  4. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2010-08-14
  5. NEP-GRO: Economic Growth (2) 2014-08-28 2015-10-17
  6. NEP-HAP: Economics of Happiness (1) 2008-06-13
  7. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (2) 2008-06-13 2015-10-17
  8. NEP-HME: Heterodox Microeconomics (1) 2015-10-17
  9. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-08-16
  10. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2011-10-09
  11. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2008-06-13
  12. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2008-06-13
  13. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2011-10-09
  14. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2011-10-09
  15. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2010-08-14
  16. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2008-06-13 2014-08-16 2015-10-17. Author is listed
  17. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2015-10-17
  18. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (1) 2011-10-09
This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Distinct Works
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  3. Number of Journal Pages
  4. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Roger Congleton should log into the RePEc Author Service

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.