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Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University, Department of Economics)

  • Dongwoo Yoo

    (West Virginia University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

According to the incremental reform hypothesis, constitutions are rarely adopted whole cloth; thus the starting point, scope for bargaining, and number of reforms, jointly determine the trajectory of constitutional history. We test the relevance of this theory for Africa by analyzing the formation and reform of the independence constitutions negotiated and adopted during the 1950s and early 1960s. We find historical evidence that independence occurred incrementally and that the African countries that experienced the fewest constitutional moments and narrowest domain of bargaining after independence have better contemporary institutions than states that began with less restrictive constitutional rules and experienced more constitutional moments.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton & Dongwoo Yoo, 2015. "Constitutional Bargaining, Eminent Domain, and the Quality of Contemporary African Institutions: A Test of the Incremental Reform Hypothesis," Working Papers 15-27, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  • Handle: RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-27
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decolonization; Independence; Constitutional Negotiations; Constitutional Bargaining; Post-Colonial Reform; Eminent Domain; Takings; Institutions; Africa;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • N47 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Africa; Oceania

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