Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Congleton, Roger D, 2001.
"Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion,"
Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 35-64, April.
- Roger Congleton, 2001. "Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 35-64, April.
- Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
More about this item
KeywordsIgnorance; Rational Ignorance; Natural Ignorance; Bounded Rationality; Rational Choice; Biased Expectations; Crisis Management; Social Insurance; Bailouts; Economics of Information;
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-10-09 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2011-10-09 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-10-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NEU-2011-10-09 (Neuroeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2011-10-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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