Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9155-z
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Keywords
Jury theorem; Rational ignorance; Elections; Delegation; Expert’s dilemma; Information aggregation; Yardstick competition; Informational policies; Liberal institutions; Effectiveness of democracy; Majority rule; Simulated elections;All these keywords.
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