Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance
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More about this item
KeywordsJury theorem; Rational ignorance; Elections; Delegation; Expert’s dilemma; Information aggregation; Yardstick competition; Informational policies; Liberal institutions; Effectiveness of democracy; Majority rule; Simulated elections;
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