Party cues and yardstick voting
Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of (political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general party lines on certain policy issues. Finally, they may be more likely to mimic one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide important cues on how politicians will act once elected. The present paper assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent empirical observations in Sweden and the United States.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ashworth, John & Geys, Benny & Heyndels, Bruno, 2006. "Determinants of tax innovation: The case of environmental taxes in Flemish municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 223-247, March.
- Martial Foucault & Thierry Madies & Sonia Paty, 2008. "Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 57-80, October.
- Poutvaara, Panu & Takalo, Tuomas, 2007.
Munich Reprints in Economics
19785, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2003. "Candidate Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 1106, CESifo Group Munich.
- Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2004. "Candidate Quality," Public Economics 0406009, EconWPA.
- Poutvaara, Panu & Takalo, Tuomas, 2004. "Candidate Quality," IZA Discussion Papers 1195, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1997.
"Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 547-81, June.
- Baicker, Katherine, 2005. "The spillover effects of state spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 529-544, February.
- Jones, Philip R & Hudson, John, 1998.
" The Role of Political Parties: An Analysis Based on Transaction Costs,"
Springer, vol. 94(1-2), pages 175-89, January.
- Philip Jones & John Hudson, 1998. "The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 175-189, January.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2001.
"Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2001.
"Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages
[Investitionsanreize bei unvollständigen Eigentumsrechten: die Rolle von Asymmetrien in Aneignungskonflikten]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 01-18, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Kai A. Konrad, 2002. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CESifo Working Paper Series 698, CESifo Group Munich.
- Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene, 2006.
"Fighting against the odds,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 75-87, 01.
- Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004.
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
- Rork, Jonathan C., 2003. "Coveting Thy Neighbors' Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 56(4), pages 775-87, December.
- Timothy Besley, 2004. "Joseph Schumpeter Lecture: Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 193-215, 04/05.
- SALMON, Pierre, 2005. "Horizontal competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2005-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties As Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489, November.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Geys, Benny, 2006.
"Looking across borders: a test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings
[Der Blick über die Grenze: Untersuchung von räumlichen Wechselbeziehungen in der Kommunal," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Geys, Benny, 2006. "Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 443-462, November.
- Revelli, Federico, 2002. "Local taxes, national politics and spatial interactions in English district election results," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 281-299, June.
- Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,"
NBER Working Papers
4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
- Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
- Salmon, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Albert Solé Ollé, 2005.
"Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain,"
2005/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Sole-Olle, Albert, 2006. "Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 32-53, January.
- Revelli, Federico, 2006.
"Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 459-475, February.
- Federico Revelli, 2004. "Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service Provision," CESifo Working Paper Series 1270, CESifo Group Munich.
- Werck, Kristien & Heyndels, Bruno & Geys, Benny, 2007.
"The impact of central places on spatial spending patterns: evidence from Flemish local government cultural expenditures
[Der Einfluss ‘Zentraler Orte’ auf räumliche Ausgabenmuster: eine empirische ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Kristien Werck & Bruno Heyndels & Benny Geys, 2008. "The impact of ‘central places’ on spatial spending patterns: evidence from Flemish local government cultural expenditures," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 35-58, March.
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:470-477. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.