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Party cues and yardstick voting

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  • Geys, Benny
  • Vermeir, Jan

Abstract

Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of (political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general party lines on certain policy issues. Finally, they may be more likely to mimic one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide important cues on how politicians will act once elected. The present paper assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent empirical observations in Sweden and the United States.

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  • Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008. "Party cues and yardstick voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 470-477, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:470-477
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    Cited by:

    1. Raffaella Santolini, 2009. "The political trend in local government tax setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 125-134, April.
    2. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    3. Kiss, Áron, 2012. "Divisive politics and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 208-214.
    4. Luis Ayala & Ana Herrero & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez, 2021. "Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(5), pages 1178-1208, October.
    5. Claudio Parés, 2010. "Political Careers Concerns and Political Parties," Working Papers 02-2010, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
    6. Pierre Salmon, 2013. "Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings," Working Papers hal-00830876, HAL.
    7. Bracco, Emanuele & Revelli, Federico, 2018. "Concurrent elections and political accountability: Evidence from Italian local elections," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 135-149.
    8. J. Sebastian Leguizamon & Casto Martin Montero Kuscevic, 2019. "Party Cues, Political Trends, And Fiscal Interactions In The United States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 600-620, October.
    9. Ferraresi, Massimiliano, 2023. "JUE Insight: Immigrants, social transfers for education, and spatial interactions," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    10. Raffaella Santolini, 2008. "A spatial cross‐sectional analysis of political trends in Italian municipalities," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(3), pages 431-451, August.
    11. Marcel Gérard & Laurent van Malderen, 2012. "Tax Interaction among Walloon Municipalities: Is there Room for Yardstick Competition, Intellectual Trend and Partisan Monopoly Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4025, CESifo.
    12. Laurent Van Malderen & Marcel Gérard, 2012. "Tax Interaction Among Walloon Municipalities: Is There Room For Partisan Monopoly Effect?," ERSA conference papers ersa12p1051, European Regional Science Association.
    13. Geys, Benny, 2012. "Success and failure in electoral competition: Selective issue emphasis under incomplete issue ownership," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-102, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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