The political trend in local government tax setting
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000.
NBER Working Papers
8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Non-Market Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1914, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Holcombe, Randall G., 1998. "Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(2), pages 359-371, June.
- Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
- Salmon, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008.
"Party cues and yardstick voting,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 470-477, June.
- Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008.
"Party cues and yardstick voting
[Parteien und 'Yardstick'-Wählen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-05, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008. "Party cues and yardstick voting
- Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
- Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pierre Salmon, 2014.
"How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper,"
Chapters,in: A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 14, pages 323-341
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Pierre Salmon, 2013. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Working Papers hal-00830872, HAL.
- Pierre Salmon, 2014. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Post-Print halshs-01230987, HAL.
- David Bartolini & Raffaella Santolini, 2012. "Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending decisions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 49(1), pages 213-235, August.
More about this item
KeywordsPolitical trend; Social interaction; Tax mimicking; D72; H71; H77;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:1:p:125-134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .