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The political trend in local government tax setting


  • Raffaella Santolini



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Suggested Citation

  • Raffaella Santolini, 2009. "The political trend in local government tax setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 125-134, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:139:y:2009:i:1:p:125-134
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9383-x

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, 2000. "Non-Market Interactions," NBER Working Papers 8053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Holcombe, Randall G., 1998. "Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(2), pages 359-371, June.
    3. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    4. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    5. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2008. "Party cues and yardstick voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 470-477, June.
    6. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2000. "Tax structure in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 493-506, March.
    7. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Parties as Political Intermediaries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1453-1489.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Salmon, 2014. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Chapters,in: A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 14, pages 323-341 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. David Bartolini & Raffaella Santolini, 2012. "Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending decisions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 49(1), pages 213-235, August.

    More about this item


    Political trend; Social interaction; Tax mimicking; D72; H71; H77;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism


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