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The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games

Author

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  • CASAL Sandro
  • FALLUCCHI Francesco
  • QUERCIA Simone

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions only when fully informed about proposers’ behavior toward the NGO. Under complete information, their willingness to reject offers increases with the strength of the harm to the NGO. Moreover, the possibility to compensate the NGO through rejection further increases their willingness to reject. In a second study aimed at gauging the importance of different motives behind rejections, we show that the two most prevalent motives are to compensate the NGO or to diminish inequality between responders and proposers. Punishing proposers’ unkind intentions towards the NGO or rejecting on the basis of pure deontological reasons constitute less important motives.

Suggested Citation

  • CASAL Sandro & FALLUCCHI Francesco & QUERCIA Simone, 2018. "The Role of Morals in Three-Player Ultimatum Games," LISER Working Paper Series 2018-15, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER).
    • Handle: RePEc:irs:cepswp:2018-15
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    Cited by:

    1. Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 380-400.
    2. Andrzej Baranski & Nicholas Haas & Rebecca Morton, 2020. "Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy," Working Papers 20200052, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jul 2020.
    3. Eberhard Feess & Florian Kerzenmacher & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2020. "Moral Transgressions by Groups: What Drives Individual Voting Behavior?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8384, CESifo.
    4. Capraro, Valerio & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2025. "Moral preferences in ultimatum and impunity games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    5. Feess, Eberhard & Kerzenmacher, Florian & Timofeyev, Yuriy, 2022. "Utilitarian or deontological models of moral behavior—What predicts morally questionable decisions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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