IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/nat/natcom/v5y2014i1d10.1038_ncomms6306.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself

Author

Listed:
  • Oriel FeldmanHall

    (New York University)

  • Peter Sokol-Hessner

    (New York University)

  • Jay J. Van Bavel

    (New York University)

  • Elizabeth A. Phelps

    (New York University
    Center for Neural Science, New York University
    Nathan Kline Institute)

Abstract

Classic psychology and economic studies argue that punishment is the standard response to violations of fairness norms. Typically, individuals are presented with the option to punish the transgressor or not. However, such a narrow choice set may fail to capture stronger alternative preferences for restoring justice. Here we show, in contrast to the majority of findings on social punishment, that other forms of justice restoration (for example, compensation to the victim) are strongly preferred to punitive measures. Furthermore, these alternative preferences for restoring justice depend on the perspective of the deciding agent. When people are the recipient of an unfair offer, they prefer to compensate themselves without seeking retribution, even when punishment is free. Yet when people observe a fairness violation targeted at another, they change their decision to the most punitive option. Together these findings indicate that humans prefer alternative forms of justice restoration to punishment alone.

Suggested Citation

  • Oriel FeldmanHall & Peter Sokol-Hessner & Jay J. Van Bavel & Elizabeth A. Phelps, 2014. "Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 5(1), pages 1-6, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:5:y:2014:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms6306
    DOI: 10.1038/ncomms6306
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms6306
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1038/ncomms6306?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dhaliwal, Nathan A. & Patil, Indrajeet & Cushman, Fiery, 2021. "Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 27-51.
    2. Bradley D Mattan & Denise M Barth & Alexandra Thompson & Oriel FeldmanHall & Jasmin Cloutier & Jennifer T Kubota, 2020. "Punishing the privileged: Selfish offers from high-status allocators elicit greater punishment from third-party arbitrators," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(5), pages 1-20, May.
    3. Pieter T. M. Desmet & Franziska Weber, 2022. "Infringers’ willingness to pay compensation versus fines," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 63-80, February.
    4. Casal, Sandro & Fallucchi, Francesco & Quercia, Simone, 2019. "The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 67-79.
    5. Janne Doorn & Marcel Zeelenberg & Seger M. Breugelmans, 2018. "An exploration of third parties’ preference for compensation over punishment: six experimental demonstrations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 333-351, October.
    6. Bicchieri, Cristina & Maras, Marta, 2022. "Intentionality matters for third-party punishment but not compensation in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 205-220.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nat:natcom:v:5:y:2014:i:1:d:10.1038_ncomms6306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.nature.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.