Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data
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- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2009. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 489-500, July.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25568, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2008. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," IDEI Working Papers 393, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2005. "Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24645, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
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Citations
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- Zhen Wang & Tomislav Vukina, 2017. "Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 120(3), pages 219-249, April.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, "undated".
"Promotion, Turover and Compensation in the Executive Market,"
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- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Promotion, Turnover and Compensation in the Executive Market," 2009 Meeting Papers 118, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Jiaojie Han & Amnon Rapoport & Rui Zhao, 2017. "Inequity-aversion and relative kindness intention jointly determine the expenditure of effort in project teams," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(5), pages 1-23, May.
- Niemi, Jarkko K., 2012. "Designing coordination contracts to support efficient flow-scheduling in pork chain," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 125208, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Deng, Wendong & Hendrikse, George, 2014. "Social capital and incentives in the provision of product quality by cooperatives," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182687, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Niemi, Jarkko K. & Liu, Xing & Pietola, Kyosti, 2011. "Price volatility and return on pig fattening under different price- quantity contract regimes," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114614, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
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More about this item
Keywords
AGENCY CONTRACTS; OPTIMAL INCENTIVES; MORAL HAZARD; RISK AVERSION; HETEROGENEITY ; AGRICULTURE CONTRACTUELLE; CONTRAT; RISQUE; INCITATION; PRODUCTION ANIMALE;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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