Tax Policy from Public Choice Perspective
Despite the fact that the tax structure is a product of the political process, rarely does an economic analysis of tax policy take account of the political environment within which the tax structure is designed. The analysis that follows begins with the recognition that the political system uses resources to desing tax systems, and these costs should be taken into account along with other welfare costs of the tax system. While public choice theory might offer much to help advance the theory of taxation, the main focus of this essay will be policy-oriented, and will begin by explicitly recognizing the political costs that are created when people try to influence tax law for their benefit.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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"Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems,"
NBER Working Papers
3038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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"The Growth of Government,"
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- Buchanan, James M., 1993. "The Political Efficiency of General Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 46(4), pages 401-10, December.
- Lott, John R, Jr, 1997. " Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: Or, Why the Difference between the Chicago and Virginia Schools Is Really an Elasticity Question," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(3-4), pages 219-27, June.
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