Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain
The paper presents a framework for measuring spillovers resulting from local expenditure policies. We identify and test for two different types of expenditure spillovers: (i) "benefit spillovers", arising from the provision of local public goods, and (ii) "crowding spillovers", arising from the crowding of facilities by residents in neighboring jurisdictions. Benefit spillovers are accounted for by assuming that the representative resident enjoys the consumption of a local public good in both his own community and in those surrounding it. Crowding spillovers are included by considering that a locality's consumption level is influenced by the population living in the surrounding localities. We estimate a reaction function, with interactions between local governments occurring not only between expenditure levels, but also between neighbors' populations and expenditures. The equation is estimated using data on more than 2,500 Spanish local governments for the year 1999. The results show that both types of spillovers are relevant.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Buettner, Thiess, 2001. "Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 215-245, April.
- Büttner, Thiess, 1998. "Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The Choice of the Tax Rate," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-43, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Thiess Buettner, 2001. "Local Business Taxation and Competition for Capital: The Choice of the Tax Rate," CESifo Working Paper Series 440, CESifo Group Munich.
- William J. Furlong & Stephen L. Mehay, 1981. "Urban Law Enforcement in Canada: An Empirical Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(1), pages 44-57, February.
- Boskin, Michael J, 1973. "Local Government Tax and Product Competition and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 203-210, Jan.-Feb..
- Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
- Conley, John & Dix, Manfred, 1999. "Optimal and Equilibrium Membership in Clubs in the Presence of Spillovers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 215-229, September.
- Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
- Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1994. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," NBER Technical Working Papers 0151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger H. Gordon, 1983. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 567-586.
- Roger H. Gordon, 1982. "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism," NBER Working Papers 1004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Le Grand, Julian, 1975. "Fiscal Equity and Central Government Grants to Local Authorities," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 85(339), pages 531-547, September.
- Craig Brett & Joris Pinkse, 2000. "The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 695-714, August.
- Baicker, Katherine, 2005. "The spillover effects of state spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 529-544, February.
- Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2004. "Central Cities as Engines of Metropolitan Area Growth," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 321-350.
- Pauly, Mark V, 1970. "Optimality, 'Public' Goods, and Local Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 572-585, May-June.
- Albert SolÃ©-OllÃ© & NÃºria Bosch, 2005. "On the Relationship between Authority Size and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(3), pages 343-384, May.
- Andrew F. Haughwout, 1999. "Regional fiscal cooperation in metropolitan areas: An exploration," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(4), pages 579-600.
- Saavedra, Luz Amparo, 2000. "A Model of Welfare Competition with Evidence from AFDC," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 248-279, March.
- Figlio, David N. & Kolpin, Van W. & Reid, William E., 1999. "Do States Play Welfare Games?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 437-454, November.
- Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October.
- Arnott, Richard & Grieson, Ronald E., 1981. "Optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 23-48, January.
- Simon Hakim & Arie Ovadia & Eli Sagi & J. Weinblatt, 1979. "Interjurisdictional Spillover of Crime and Police Expenditure," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 54(2), pages 200-212. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juecon:v:59:y:2006:i:1:p:32-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.