Horizontal competition among governments
Governments situated on the same level of a multi-level governmental system compete with each other as well as with those placed higher or lower. This paper is concerned with horizontal competition only. It discusses both competition based on the mobility of agents (individuals, business firms, or factors) and competition related to the circulation of information. With regard to the first kind, it focuses on the capacity that governments keep to decide their policies and compete in spite of the mobility of agents. Some attention is also given to the implications of some non-standard assumptions about the underlying political set-up. The discussion of information-based competition includes that of "laboratory federalism" (whether decentralization favours innovation) and of "yardstick competition" (what are the effects of comparisons of governments' comparative performance across jurisdictions). Some questions pertaining to the relationship between the different forms of horizontal competition and to their normative and empirical dimensions are addressed briefly.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Pôle d'Economie et de Gestion - 2, bd Gabriel - BP 26611 - F-21066 Dijon cedex - France|
Phone: 00 333 80 39 54 41
Fax: 00 333 80 39 54 43
Web page: http://www.leg.u-bourgogne.fr/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Breton, Albert & Salmon, Pierre, 2001.
"External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 135-155, June.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2001. "External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade," Post-Print hal-00445626, HAL.
- SALMON, Pierre, 2003.
"Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments,"
LEG - Document de travail - Economie
2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," Post-Print hal-00445603, HAL.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition,"
NBER Working Papers
4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Bruno Heyndels & John Ashworth, 2003. "Self--Serving Bias in Tax Perceptions: Federalism as a Source of Political Instability," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 47-68, February.
- Epple, Dennis & Nechyba, Thomas, 2004. "Fiscal decentralization," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 55, pages 2423-2480 Elsevier.
- Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-57, Part I Se.
- Roland Vaubel, 1999. "Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 327-338, November.
- Esty, Daniel C. & Geradin, Damien (ed.), 2001. "Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198299059, December.
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
- Cardarelli, Roberto & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle & Vidal, Jean-Pierre, 2002.
" A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(1), pages 19-38.
- Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a34, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Cardarelli, R. & Taugourdeau, E. & Vidal, J.-P., 1999. "A Repeated Interactions Model of Tax Competition," Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications 1999.73, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Feld, Lars P, 2000. "Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005.
"Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:,"
Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2001. "Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation," CESifo Working Paper Series 501, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stefan Sinn, 1992. "The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 177-196, March.
- Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996.
"Tax competition and Leviathan,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
- Caplan, Bryan, 2001. "When is two better than one? How federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 99-119, April.
- Galeotti, Gianluigi & Breton, Albert, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Political Parties," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 47-65.
- Hans-Werner Sinn, 2001.
"The New Systems Competition,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
623, CESifo Group Munich.
- Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Jan K. Brueckner, 2003. "Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of Empirical Studies," International Regional Science Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 26(2), pages 175-188, April.
- Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
- Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W., 1996. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 351-371, June.
- Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2003. "Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 57-77, January.
- Alain Mingat & Pierre Salmon, 1988. "Alterable electorates in the context of residential mobility," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 67-82, October.
- Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Epple, Dennis & Zelenitz, Allan, 1981. "The Implications of Competition among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1197-1217, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lat:legeco:2005-02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Odile Ferry)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.