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Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

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  • Breton, Albert
  • Fraschini, Angela

Abstract

In unitary states--states in which constitutional powers are owned by the central government--vertical competition can generate stable outcomes, that is outcomes that do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions by the center. Stability is a product of institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it cannot bind successor governments, can effectively oblige them to respect some of the decisions it has made. A number of such commitment devices exist in Italy; they make possible stable vertical competition between central and regional governments. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2003. "Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 57-77, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:1-2:p:57-77
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:spr:grdene:v:10:y:2001:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1011252808608 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Antonio Romero-Medina & Katari´na Cechlárová, 2001. "Stability in coalition formation games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 487-494.
    3. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
    4. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 62-82.
    5. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Breton, Albert & Fraschini, Angela, 2016. "Is Italy a Federal or even a Quasi-Federal State?," POLIS Working Papers 186, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    2. Alberto Majocchi, 2008. "Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience," ISAE Working Papers 100, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Pierre Salmon, 2006. "Horizontal Competition Among Governments," Chapters,in: Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Joan Costa Font & Ramon Tremosa Balcells, 2006. "National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country," Working Papers in Economics 151, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    6. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A political agency model of coattail voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
    7. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
    8. Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2003. "The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 319-333, December.
    10. Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico, 2006. "Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 477-498, September.
    11. Pierre Salmon, 2014. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Chapters,in: A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics, chapter 14, pages 323-341 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2006. "Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 165-187.
    13. Costa-Font, Joan & Tremosa-Balcells, Ramon, 2008. "Support for state opting out and stateless national identity in the Basque Country," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2464-2477, December.

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