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Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe


  • Albert Breton
  • Heinrich Ursprung


The traditional school of economic policy analysis predicts that globalisation will give rise to predatory competition between the governments of the European nation states. The consequence is anticipated to be a marked reduction in, if not the destruction of, the benevolent Welfare State. The objective of this contribution is to present the main arguments that have led us to believe that, this traditional literature notwithstanding, a European constitution should not restrict but rather should encourage horizontal and vertical governmental competition. In our view the European political order, in defining the relationship among member states and also the relationship between the member states and the EU, ought to be inspired by what we know about competition in the commercial sphere.

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  • Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_657

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vanberg Viktor J., 2008. "Markt und Staat in einer globalisierten Welt: Die ordnungsökonomische Perspektive / Market and state in a globalized world: the perspective of constitutional economics," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 3-30, January.
    2. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 993, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," Post-Print hal-00445603, HAL.

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