Economic Integration and Political Accountability
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- Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004. "Economic integration and political accountability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1001-1025, October.
- Zantman, W., 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Accountability," Papers 00-540, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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Cited by:
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018.
"Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?,"
Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2017. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses ?," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-11, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can supranational infrastructure regulation compensate for national institutional weaknesses?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/284774, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Post-Print halshs-02087821, HAL.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02087821, HAL.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A political agency model of coattail voting,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," MPRA Paper 28800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," Working Papers 2072/151618, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Mandel Philipp & Süssmuth Bernd, 2015.
"Public Education, Accountability, and Yardstick Competition in a Federal System,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 1679-1703, October.
- Mandel, Philipp & Süßmuth, Bernd, 2015. "Public education, accountability, and yardstick competition in a federal system," Working Papers 138, University of Leipzig, Faculty of Economics and Management Science.
- Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002.
"Globalization, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), Europe and Globalization, chapter 13, pages 274-301,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005.
"Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
- Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2001. "Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation," CESifo Working Paper Series 501, CESifo.
- Guillaume Cheikbossian & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2011.
"Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring,"
Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 327-345.
- Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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Keywords
; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- P45 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages
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