Economic Integration and Political Accountability
This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to establish a link between economic integration and accountability. We first define economic integration noe only by the existence of externalities between countries but also by the positive correlation of shocks accross the countries. Then, from a political point of view, we show that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the correlation of shocks allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians. On the other hand, it induces a lack of responsability because of the existence of externalities. Therefore, the political effect of economic integration depends on the relative strength of those two effects.
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