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Economic integration and political accountability

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  • Sand-Zantman, Wilfried

Abstract

This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to establish a link between economic integration and accountability. We first define economic integration noe only by the existence of externalities between countries but also by the positive correlation of shocks accross the countries. Then, from a political point of view, we show that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the correlation of shocks allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians. On the other hand, it induces a lack of responsability because of the existence of externalities. Therefore, the political effect of economic integration depends on the relative strength of those two effects.
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  • Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2004. "Economic integration and political accountability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1001-1025, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:48:y:2004:i:5:p:1001-1025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 3-8, Fall.
    2. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
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    8. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    9. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
    3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A political agency model of coattail voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
    4. Mandel Philipp & Süssmuth Bernd, 2015. "Public Education, Accountability, and Yardstick Competition in a Federal System," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(4), pages 1679-1703, October.
    5. Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalization, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), Europe and Globalization, chapter 13, pages 274-301, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
    7. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2011. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 101-102, pages 327-345.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • P45 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages

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