Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience
In the European experience it appears to be a significant deviation from Oates’s theoretical model since the Maastricht Treaty has not assumed as necessary to transfer the direct management of stabilization policy to the supranational level. Stabilization policy is in fact managed by member-states, although its coordination is to be ensured at supranational level. In the field of redistribution, the European level must undertake territorial redistribution so that equalizing transfers ensure that all areas of the European Union offer equal opportunities and certain basic services are furnished uniformly. The member-states and local communities, for their part, must maintain their responsibilities for the management of social policy and the redistribution of personal income – according to the preferences of each community – while averting the perverse effects in terms of mobility envisaged by the theoretical model of fiscal federalism.
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