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Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience

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  • Alberto Majocchi

    (ISAE - Institute for Studies and Economic Analyses and University of Pavia)

Abstract

In the European experience it appears to be a significant deviation from Oates’s theoretical model since the Maastricht Treaty has not assumed as necessary to transfer the direct management of stabilization policy to the supranational level. Stabilization policy is in fact managed by member-states, although its coordination is to be ensured at supranational level. In the field of redistribution, the European level must undertake territorial redistribution so that equalizing transfers ensure that all areas of the European Union offer equal opportunities and certain basic services are furnished uniformly. The member-states and local communities, for their part, must maintain their responsibilities for the management of social policy and the redistribution of personal income – according to the preferences of each community – while averting the perverse effects in terms of mobility envisaged by the theoretical model of fiscal federalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Majocchi, 2008. "Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience," ISAE Working Papers 100, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    • Handle: RePEc:isa:wpaper:100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dodescu Anca, 2011. "Experiences And Tendencies To Decentralize The Capabilities Of The Economic Policy At The European Union Level," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(special), pages 47-61, July.
    2. repec:prg:jnlpep:v:preprint:id:698:p:1-15 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Andrii Boiar, 2019. "Optimizing the Structure of the European UnionBudget Expenditure," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2019(3), pages 348-362.
    4. Ivan Ilkov, 2014. "Fiscal problems in the Eurozone," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 3, pages 81-104.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal federalism;

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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