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Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilization Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization and EMU

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  • Bayoumi, Tamim
  • Masson, Paul R

Abstract

This paper looks at theoretical and empirical issues associated with the operation of fiscal stabilizers within an economy. It argues that such stabilizers operate most effectively at a national, rather than local, level. As differing cycles across regions tend to offset each other for the country as a whole, national fiscal stabilizers are not associated with the same increase in future tax liabilities for the region as local ones. Accordingly, the negative impact from the Ricardian effects associated with these tax liabilities is smaller. Empirical work on data across Canadian provinces indicates that local stabilizers are only one-third to one-half as effective as national stabilizers which create no future tax liability.

Suggested Citation

  • Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R, 1998. "Liability-Creating Versus Non-Liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilization Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilization and EMU," CEPR Discussion Papers 1984, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1984
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Majocchi, 2008. "Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience," ISAE Working Papers 100, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
    2. Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B & González, Christian Y, 2003. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America: a complement to national," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34927, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. Kenen, Peter B., 2000. "Currency areas, policy domains, and the institutionalization of fixed exchange rates," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20170, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Wagner, Gary A., 2003. "Are state budget stabilization funds only the illusion of savings?: Evidence from stationary panel data," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 213-238.
    5. Becerra, Ligia Melo, 2004. "Intergovernmental fiscal relations : the Colombian case," Economics PhD Theses 0304, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
    6. Tigran Poghosyan & Abdelhak S Senhadji & Carlo Cottarelli, 2016. "The Role of Fiscal Transfers in Smoothing Regional Shocks; Evidence from Existing Federations," IMF Working Papers 16/141, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Gianluigi Giorgioni & Ken Holden, 2003. "Ricardian equivalence, expansionary fiscal contraction and the stock market: a VECM approach," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(12), pages 1435-1443.
    8. Pierfederico Asdrubali & Soyoung Kim, 2008. "The Economic Effects of the EU Budget: A VAR Analysis," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46, pages 933-968, December.
    9. Etienne Farvaque & Florence Huart, 2017. "A policymaker’s guide to a Euro area stabilization fund," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(1), pages 11-30, April.
    10. Lenaerts, Karolien & Paquier, Félix & Simonetta, Suzanne, 2017. "Unemployment Insurance in America: A model for Europe?," CEPS Papers 12684, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    11. Tomas Wroblowsky, 2007. "Explaining the Variability of Debt Neutrality Tests Results: A Meta-Analysis of Ricardian Equivalence," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 5(1), pages 7-24.
    12. Fatas, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2001. "Government size and automatic stabilizers: international and intranational evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 3-28, October.
    13. Jha, Raghbendra, 2001. "Macroeconomics of Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries," Departmental Working Papers 2001-05, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    14. Muhammad Afzal, 2012. "Ricardian equivalence hypothesis: Evidence from Pakistan," E3 Journal of Business Management and Economics., E3 Journals, vol. 3(6), pages 258-265.
    15. Gonzalez, Christian Y. & Rosenblatt, David & Webb, Steven B., 2002. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America : a complement to national/subnational fiscal rules?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2869, The World Bank.
    16. Ligia Alba Melo-Becerra, 2015. "The role of the sub-national public sector in the stabilization function: Evidence from the Colombian case for the period 1990-2001," REVISTA FINANZAS Y POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE COLOMBIA, vol. 7(2), pages 299-324, July.
    17. Fritz Breuss, 2012. "Towards a New EMU," WIFO Working Papers 447, WIFO.
    18. Thomas Uril, 2001. "Avoiding excessive deficits with fiscal coordination light," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;German National Library of Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 36(6), pages 281-285, November.
    19. Casimir Dadak, 2011. "Political Economy of the Euro Area Crisis," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(5), pages 593-604, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Stabilization; levels of government; Ricardian Equivalence;

    JEL classification:

    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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