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Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America: a complement to national

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  • Webb, Steven B
  • González, Christian Y
  • Rosenblatt, David

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  • Webb, Steven B & González, Christian Y & Rosenblatt, David, 2003. "Stabilizing intergovernmental transfers in Latin America: a complement to national," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34927, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col093:34927
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    File URL: http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/34927
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernesto Stein & Ernesto Talvi & Alejandro Grisanti, 1999. "Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 103-134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R, 1998. "Liability-Creating versus Non-liability-Creating Fiscal Stabilisation Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilisation, and EMU," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(449), pages 1026-1045, July.
    3. Maurice Obstfeld & Giovanni Peri, 1998. "Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 206-259.
    4. Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 157-212, January.
    5. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, June.
    6. Mr. George Kopits, 2001. "Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?," IMF Working Papers 2001/145, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Huertas, Marcela & Perry, Guillermo, 1997. "La historia de una crisis anunciada: regulando el endeudamiento de las municipalidades y los departamentos en Colombia," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 30864, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
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    Cited by:

    1. Webb, Steven B., 2004. "Fiscal responsibility laws for subnational discipline : the Latin American experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3309, The World Bank.
    2. World Bank, 2010. "Argentina - Economic Memorandum for the Province of Buenos Aires : Key Public Policy Issues," World Bank Publications - Reports 18521, The World Bank Group.

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