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Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
  2. David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger & Marco Portmann, 2011. "Parliaments as Condorcet Juries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Representation of Majority Preferences," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  3. Blesse, Sebastian & Lergetporer, Philipp & Nover, Justus & Werner, Katharina, 2023. "Transparency and policy competition: Experimental evidence from German citizens and politicians," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-007, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  4. Bryan C. McCannon, 2018. "Arbitration in classical Athens," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 413-423, December.
  5. Batinti, Alberto & Congleton, Roger D., 2018. "On the codetermination of tax-financed medical R&D and healthcare expenditures: Models and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 175-188.
  6. Roger Congleton, 2012. "On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 399-423, March.
  7. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  8. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Urs Steiner Brandt, 2021. "The calculus of democratic deliberation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 165-186, June.
  9. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
  10. Bryan C. McCannon & Joylynn Pruitt, 2018. "Taking on the boss: Informative contests in prosecutor elections," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 657-671, October.
  11. Roger D. Congleton, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-193, June.
  12. Roger D. Congleton, 2019. "Fiscal Bargaining and the Implicit Fiscal Constitutions of Liberal Democracies: A Public Choice Perspective," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 15(2), pages 175-198, December.
  13. Congleton, R.D., 2007. "Democracy in America: Labor Mobility, Ideology, and Constitutional Reform," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0764, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. Roger D. Congleton, 2023. "Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 73-100, April.
  15. Roland Kirstein, "undated". "The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1154, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  16. Arye L. Hillman, 2021. "Harming a favored side: an anomaly with supreme values and good intentions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 275-285, March.
  17. Roger D. Congleton & Alberto Batinti & Rinaldo Pietratonio, 2017. "The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 483-510, November.
  18. Congleton, Roger D., 2011. "Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?," CIW Discussion Papers 6/2011, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
  19. Roger D. Congleton, 2015. "On the Evolution of Organizational Governance: Divided Governance and Survival in the Long Run," Working Papers 15-25, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  20. Roger Congleton & Yongjing Zhang, 2013. "Is it all about competence? The human capital of U.S. presidents and economic performance," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 108-124, June.
  21. Christopher J Ellis & John Fender, 2010. "Information Aggregation, Growth and Franchise Extension with Applications to Female Enfranchisement and Inequality," Discussion Papers 10-27, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  22. Dashle Kelley, 2014. "The political economy of unfunded public pension liabilities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 21-38, January.
  23. Hans Gersbach, 2021. "Elections, the curse of competence and credence policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 491-511, March.
  24. Alexander Lundberg, 2020. "The importance of expertise in group decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 495-521, October.
  25. Keith L. Dougherty & Robi Ragan, 2016. "An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 332-353, September.
  26. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
  27. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2014. "The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 128-140.
  28. Soeren C. Schwuchow & George Tridimas, 2022. "The political economy of Solon’s law against neutrality in civil wars," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 249-272, September.
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