Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
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References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
- Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
- Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997.
"The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
- Yves Balasko & Hervé Crès, 1995. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 95.01, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
- Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
- Tullock, Gordon, 1973. "Inheritance Rejustified," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 425-428, October.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_1 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 571-571.
- Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
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- Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
More about this item
KeywordsGordon Tullock; Coercion; Conflict; Law; Authoritarian; Constitutional political economy;
- B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
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