Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government
Abstract Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.
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Volume (Year): 27 (2016)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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- Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:567-576_10 is not listed on IDEAS Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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