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Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government

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  • Roger D. Congleton

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

Gordon Tullock wrote widely on the emergence and effects of political and legal institutions. Although he did not provide an analytical narrative, perse, his work provides explanations for the emergence of the state, civil law, constitutional law, and democracy. When his work is organized as a historical narrative, it becomes clear that conflict, rather than trade or cooperation, are at the core of Tullock’s approach to constitutional political economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-193, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:27:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-016-9213-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9213-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Roger Congleton, 2012. "The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 131-146, July.
    3. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    4. Tullock, Gordon, 1973. "Inheritance Rejustified," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 425-428, October.
    5. repec:elg:eechap:15325_1 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
    7. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    8. Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 2015. "Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15325.
    9. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67, pages 571-571.
    10. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    11. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    12. Balasko, Yves & Cres, Herve, 1997. "The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 237-270, August.
    13. Bienen, Henry & van de Walle, Nicolas, 1989. "Time and Power in Africa," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 19-34, March.
    14. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
    15. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gordon Tullock; Coercion; Conflict; Law; Authoritarian; Constitutional political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B2 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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