IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/vrs/poicbe/v13y2019i1p889-899n78.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Apăvăloaei Matei-Alexandru

    (The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Jora Octavian-Dragomir

    (The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

  • Iacob Mihaela

    (The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania)

Abstract

This paper is an interdisciplinary analysis of the benefits and limits of political competition. We start from the economic theory of monopoly and extend its implications on matters concerning political action. If the state is defined as the institution that holds the monopoly on coercion over a given territory, are the democratic selection process (internal political competition) and the possibility open to an economic agent to leave for more economically free jurisdictions (international political competition) enough to temper its reach? By referring to the inherent limits that plague collective action, voter rational ignorance, and the possibility of redistributing benefits and incumbent decision-maker collaboration when it comes to trading votes, we argue that democratic competition cannot be considered an effective restraint against political discretion. Because of this, we consider that international political competition can offer better protection against political action. However, even the possibility of voting with one’s feet or observing the political milieu in another territory become manageable if political decision-makers decide to collude at the international level. Also, emigration is an economically costly and psychologically exacting decision that ultimately implies choosing between two state-controlled jurisdictions. Therefore, even the choice of voting with one’s feet is a second-best solution that, in practice, might not prove to be an effective restraint on the state’s monopoly discretion.

Suggested Citation

  • Apăvăloaei Matei-Alexandru & Jora Octavian-Dragomir & Iacob Mihaela, 2019. "Voting with Your Brain or Heart, Hands or Feet? An Enquiry in the Microeconomics of Intra- and Inter- National Political Competition," Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence, Sciendo, vol. 13(1), pages 889-899, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:vrs:poicbe:v:13:y:2019:i:1:p:889-899:n:78
    DOI: 10.2478/picbe-2019-0078
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2019-0078
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2478/picbe-2019-0078?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gordon Tullock, 1971. "The paradox of revolution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-99, September.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    3. Roland Vaubel, 2008. "A History of Thought on Institutional Competition," Chapters, in: Andreas Bergh & Rolf Höijer (ed.), Institutional Competition, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Jora Octavian-Dragomir & Apăvăloaei Matei-Alexandru & Iacob Mihaela, 2018. "Cultural heritage markets: are traders traitors? Winners and losers from cross-border shifts of historical artefacts," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 897-912, June.
    5. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roger D. Congleton, 2016. "Gordon Tullock’s implicit analytical history of government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 179-193, June.
    2. Hummel Jeffrey Rogers & Lavoie Don, 1994. "National Defense And The Public-Goods Problem," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2-3), pages 1-26, June.
    3. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
    4. Adlai Newson & Francesco Trebbi, 2018. "Authoritarian elites," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(4), pages 1088-1117, November.
    5. Vlad Tarko & Kyle O’Donnell, 2019. "Escape from Europe: a calculus of consent model of the origins of liberal institutions in the North American colonies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 70-95, March.
    6. Daniel Horgos & Klaus W. Zimmermann, 2010. "It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 383-399, August.
    7. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2001. "Group formation and competition: instrumental and expressive approaches," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 110, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. Apolte, Thomas, 1996. "Economic reform and democracy : Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, and London, 1995)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 561-564, November.
    9. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2020. "Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests," CEPR Discussion Papers 14385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Datta, Sandip, 2020. "Political competition and public healthcare expenditure: Evidence from Indian states," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 244(C).
    11. Mulligan Casey B & Gil Ricard & Sala-i-Martin Xavier X, 2010. "Social Security and Democracy," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, March.
    12. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2011. "The boundaries of the state," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 11/3, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    13. Astghik Mavisakalyan & Vladimir Otrachshenko & Olga Popova, 2023. "Does democracy protect the environment? The role of the Arctic Council," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 176(5), pages 1-21, May.
    14. Joe Oppenheimer, 1985. "Public choice and three ethical properties of politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-255, January.
    15. Hélène Laurent, 2021. "Corruption and politicians’ horizon," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 65-91, March.
    16. Möller, Marie, 2011. "Economic voting and economic revolutionizing? The economics of incumbency changes in European democracies and revolutionary events in the Arab World," CIW Discussion Papers 10/2011, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    17. Apolte, Thomas, 2015. "Autocracy and the public: Mass revolts, winning coalitions, and policy control in dictatorships," CIW Discussion Papers 5/2015, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    18. Dennis C. Mueller, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: economic gadfly," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 112-123, June.
    19. Raisa Sherif, 2022. "Why do we vote? Evidence on expressive voting," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2022-04, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    20. Jennifer Murtazashvili & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2020. "Wealth-destroying states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 353-371, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vrs:poicbe:v:13:y:2019:i:1:p:889-899:n:78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciendo.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.