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Do Remittances Crowd Out The Government¡¯S Redistributive Policy?

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  • Ikuho Kochi

    (Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez)

  • Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

    (Universidad Autonoma de Ciudad Juarez)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a political economy model with a voting equilibrium to analyze the impact of remittances in the government¡¯s redistributive policy. Remittances affect the distribution of income and the households¡¯ demand for public redistribution. In this paper we consider the impact of remittances on two types of redistributive programs: a universal and a targeted transfer program. For an economy with targeted public transfers, we identify conditions in which an increase in remittances crowds out the social transfers of the government. If the redistributive program is universal then an increase in remittances actually increases the size of the government¡¯s transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ikuho Kochi & Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez, 2010. "Do Remittances Crowd Out The Government¡¯S Redistributive Policy?," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 35(4), pages 45-72, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jed:journl:v:35:y:2010:i:4:p:45-72
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sondra Collins & Edward Nissan, 2016. "Comparing Africa, Asia and Latin America/Caribbean countries using per capita GDP, remittances, openness, capital/labor ratios and freedom," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 40(1), pages 188-198, January.
    2. Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez & Benito Alan Ponce Rodríguez, 2023. "Remittances and the Size and Composition of Government Spending," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 18(4), pages 1-23, Octubre -.
    3. Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez & Ikuho Kochi, 2017. "Remittances, Lorenz Dominance in the Distribution of Income and Redistribution," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 8(1).
    4. Moises Neil V. Serino & Donghun Kim, 2011. "How Do International Remittances Affect Poverty In Developing Countries? A Quantile Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 17-40, December.
    5. Ikuho Kochi & Ra¨²l Alberto Ponce Rodr¨ªguez, 2016. "International Private Transfers and Optimal Tax Structure in Developing Economies," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 6, pages 13-26, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • F24 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Remittances

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