Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy
In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-gov\-ern\-men\-tal transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties’ political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending.
Volume (Year): 26 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.colmex.mx/centros/cee/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John E. Roemer, 1997. "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case," Social Choice and Welfare, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 14(4), pages 479-502.
- Lockwood, Ben, 1998.
"Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ben Lockwood, 2002. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
- Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, june. pag.
- Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November.
- Khemani, Stuti, 2003. "Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3016, The World Bank.
- Hettich,Walter & Winer,Stanley L., 2005.
"Democratic Choice and Taxation,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521021807, june. pag.
- Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
- Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2002.
"The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
767, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sam Bucovetsky & Michael Smart, 2006. "The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 119-144, 01.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emx:esteco:v:26:y:2011:i:1:p:123-149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rocío Contreras)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.