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Regional income disparity and the size of the Public Sector

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  • Giuranno, Michele

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the question of how income inequality between two jurisdictions impacts upon government decision-making affecting the size of the public sector. We model policy choices as the outcome of regional representatives'negotiations in the legislature. We show that the more unequal inter-regional income distribution is, the greater the under-provision of public goods. Particularly, larger inter-regional income disparity leads to a smaller public sector. A wealthier economy as a result may have a relatively smaller government size when income disparity increases.

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File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/giuranno126.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 114.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:114
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

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Cited by:

  1. Michele Giuseppe Giuranno, 2009. "Regional Income Disparity and the Size of the Public Sector," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(5), pages 697-719, October.
  2. Giuranno, Michele G. & Rongili, Biswas, 2012. "Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government," MPRA Paper 42604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Giuranno, Michele G., 2010. "Pooling sovereignty under the subsidiary principle," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 125-136, March.
  4. Privileggi, Fabio, 2008. "On the transition dynamics in endogenous recombinant growth models," POLIS Working Papers 120, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  5. Bondonio, Daniele, 2009. "Impact identification strategies for evaluating business incentive programs," POLIS Working Papers 129, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  6. J. Stephen Ferris, 2010. "Fiscal Policy from a Public Choice Perspective," Carleton Economic Papers 10-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  7. Fabio Fiorillo & Agnese Sacchi, 2012. "The Political Economy of the Standard Level of Services: The Role of Income Distribution," CESifo Working Paper Series 3696, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Piero Cavaleri & Michael Keren & Giovanni B. Ramello & Vittorio Valli, 2009. "Publishing an E-Journal on a Shoe String: Is It a Sustainable Project?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 89-101, March.
  9. Orso, Cristina Elisa, 2009. "Formal and informal sectors: Interactions between moneylenders and traditional banks in the rural Indian credit market," POLIS Working Papers 135, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  10. Michele Giuranno, 2009. "Pooling Sovereignty and Subsidiarity Principle," Discussion Papers 09/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
  11. Giuranno, Michele, 2009. "The logic of party coalitions with political activism and public financing," POLIS Working Papers 134, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  12. Giuranno, Michele & Biswas, Rongili, 2015. "Internal migration and public policy," POLIS Working Papers 183, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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