Inequality and club formation
We study the relationship between social segmentation and income inequality by means of the economic theory of clubs with private provision of the club good. After having characterized the equilibrium partition of society in clubs and investigating its characteristics, we show how the clubs' sizes depend on the rate of income increase and compare segmentation profiles arising in societies characterized by different inequality patterns.
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