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Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Author

Listed:
  • BARHAM, V.
  • BOADWAY, R.
  • MARCHAND, M.
  • PESTIEAU, P.

Abstract

The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analysed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
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Suggested Citation

  • Barham, V. & Boadway, R. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1277, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1277
    DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00003-0
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 65, 9-22, 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Desdoigts, Alain & Moizeau, Fabien, 2001. "Multiple politico-economic regimes, inequality and growth," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,65, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    2. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2010. "On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, September.
    3. Loek Groot & Daan van der Linde, 2017. "The Labor-Managed Firm: Permanent or Start-Up Subsidies?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(4), pages 1074-1093, October.
    4. Cugno, Franco & Ferrero, Mario, 2004. "Competition among volunteers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 637-654, September.
    5. Fernando Jaramillo & Fabien Moizeau, 2003. "Conspicuous Consumption and Social Segmentation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, January.
    6. Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau, 2009. "Inequality, Growth, and the Dynamics of Social Segmentation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 529-564, August.
    7. Andreas Tutić, 2013. "Experimental evidence on the theory of club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(1), pages 90-120, February.
    8. Jaramillo, Fernando & Kempf, Hubert & Moizeau, Fabien, 2003. "Inequality and club formation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 931-955, May.
    9. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Other publications TiSEM c4c17d0c-941f-4bb6-b9e6-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Discussion Paper 2000-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Tomoo Kikuchi & Shuige Liu & Lien Pham, 2022. "Pecuniary Externality, Ideology and Sphere of Influence," Papers 2209.10206, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    12. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.

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