IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v65y1997i1p9-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality

Author

Listed:
  • Barham, Vicky
  • Boadway, Robin
  • Marchand, Maurice
  • Pestieau, Pierre

Abstract

The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analysed in the context of a two-stage game in which club size is determined endogenously. Equilibrium club size and voluntary labour supply are shown to be inefficient. The impact of optimally-chosen fiscal policies using simple instruments is studied. When agents do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from volunteer work, lump-sum grants can be used to implement the first-best equal treatment allocation but private provision is fully crowded out. Otherwise, it is found that simple fiscal instruments cannot implement the first-best equal-treatment allocation unless club size is directly regulated.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Barham, Vicky & Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-22, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:65:y:1997:i:1:p:9-22
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(97)00003-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 789-793, September.
    3. Boadway, Robin & Pestieau, Pierre & Wildasin, David, 1989. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 157-176, July.
    4. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    6. Bernheim, B Douglas & Bagwell, Kyle, 1988. "Is Everything Neutral?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 308-338, April.
    7. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2010. "On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, September.
    2. Loek Groot & Daan van der Linde, 2017. "The Labor-Managed Firm: Permanent or Start-Up Subsidies?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(4), pages 1074-1093, October.
    3. Cugno, Franco & Ferrero, Mario, 2004. "Competition among volunteers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 637-654, September.
    4. Fernando Jaramillo & Fabien Moizeau, 2003. "Conspicuous Consumption and Social Segmentation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, January.
    5. Andreas Tutić, 2013. "Experimental evidence on the theory of club goods," Rationality and Society, , vol. 25(1), pages 90-120, February.
    6. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Other publications TiSEM c4c17d0c-941f-4bb6-b9e6-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau, 2009. "Inequality, Growth, and the Dynamics of Social Segmentation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 529-564, August.
    8. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Discussion Paper 2000-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    9. Tomoo Kikuchi & Shuige Liu, 2022. "The Power of Non-Superpowers," Papers 2209.10206, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    10. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.
    11. Desdoigts, Alain & Moizeau, Fabien, 2001. "Multiple politico-economic regimes, inequality and growth," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,65, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    12. Jaramillo, Fernando & Kempf, Hubert & Moizeau, Fabien, 2003. "Inequality and club formation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 931-955, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Serge-Christophe Kolm, 2008. "Paradoxes of the War on Poverty: Warm-Glows and Efficiency," IDEP Working Papers 0807, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 18 Nov 2008.
    2. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1998. "An experimental test of the crowding out hypothesis: The nature of beneficent behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 315-331, November.
    3. Yamamoto, Wataru, 2013. "Negative economic consequences of ethical campaigns?: Market data evidence," MPRA Paper 49070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Diamond, Peter, 2006. "Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 897-919, May.
    5. Konrad, Kai A., 1992. "The advantage of being poor: private provision of public goods, strategic incentives and the role of public provision," EconStor Research Reports 112687, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    6. Daniel Goulao, 2005. "Review of Privade Provided Public Goods Literature," Public Economics 0501006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Konrad, Kai A., 1998. "Local public goods and central charities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 345-362, May.
    8. Tomáš Sigmund, 2015. "Vztah etického a ekonomického chování [The relationship of ethical and economic behaviour]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2015(2), pages 223-243.
    9. Lee, Kangoh, 2008. "Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 163-176, January.
    10. Romano, Richard & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2001. "Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 423-447, September.
    11. Gronberg, Timothy J. & Luccasen, R. Andrew & Turocy, Theodore L. & Van Huyck, John B., 2012. "Are tax-financed contributions to a public good completely crowded-out? Experimental evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(7-8), pages 596-603.
    12. Marc Bilodeau & Al Slivinski, 1998. "Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 551-571, December.
    13. Jim Andreoni, "undated". "Do Government Subsidies Affect the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Papers _033, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
    14. Karen Pittel & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2006. "Private provision of public goods: incentives for donations," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 33(6), pages 497-519, November.
    15. Tamai, Toshiki, 2010. "Public goods provision, redistributive taxation, and wealth accumulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1067-1072, December.
    16. Karen Smith Conway, 1994. "Reconsidering the Effects of Fiscal Policy On Private Sector Behavior: a Unifying View of Neutrality," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(2), pages 195-221, April.
    17. Garth Heutel, 2014. "Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants," Public Finance Review, , vol. 42(2), pages 143-175, March.
    18. Etner, Johanna & Jeleva, Meglena & Jouvet, Pierre-Andre, 2007. "Risk perceptions, voluntary contributions and environmental policy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 130-139, September.
    19. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    20. James Andreoni & Abigail Payne, 2007. "Crowding out Both Sides of the Philanthropy Market: Evidence from a Panel of Charities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001769, UCLA Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:65:y:1997:i:1:p:9-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.