The Labor Managed Firm: Permanent or Start Subsidies?
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- Loek Groot & Daan van der Linde, 2017. "The Labor-Managed Firm: Permanent or Start-Up Subsidies?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(4), pages 1074-1093, October.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywordslabor managed firm; profit sharing; ESOP; game theory;
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