IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/use/tkiwps/1504.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Labor Managed Firm: Permanent or Start Subsidies?

Author

Listed:
  • L.F.M. Groot
  • D.E. van der Linde

Abstract

Given a range of market failures that persist in the present-day capitalist firm, we explore a novel argument of why the alternative of the labor managed firm is largely absent and argue public intervention should primarily be aimed at the start-up phase of labor managed firms rather than providing permanent tax subsidies. We derive the crucial condition for the emergence of labor managed firms, and show that this condition is unduly restrictive from an efficiency point of view.

Suggested Citation

  • L.F.M. Groot & D.E. van der Linde, 2015. "The Labor Managed Firm: Permanent or Start Subsidies?," Working Papers 15-04, Utrecht School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:1504
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/315837/15_04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dow, G & Putterman, L, 1996. "Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor : An Assessment of Proposed Explanations," Discussion Papers dp97-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    2. Fakhfakh F. & Perotin V. & Gago M., 2009. "Productivity, Capital and Labor in Labor-Managed and Conventional Firms," Working Papers ERMES 0910, ERMES, University Paris 2.
    3. Conte, Michael A. & Svejnar, Jan, 1988. "Productivity effects of worker participation in management, profit-sharing, worker ownership of assets and unionization in U.S. firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 139-151, March.
    4. Barham, Vicky & Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Pestieau, Pierre, 1997. "Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-22, July.
    5. Burdín, Gabriel & Dean, Andrés, 2009. "New evidence on wages and employment in worker cooperatives compared with capitalist firms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 517-533, December.
    6. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-477, June.
    7. Todd Sandler & John Tschirhart, 1997. "Club theory: Thirty years later," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 335-355, December.
    8. Donald George, 1997. "Self-management and Ideology," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(1), pages 51-62.
    9. Gregory Dow, 2001. "Allocating Control over Firms: Stock Markets versus Membership Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(2), pages 201-218, March.
    10. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    11. Kruse, Douglas L, 1992. "Profit Sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence from the United States," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 24-36, January.
    12. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    13. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
    14. Artz, Georgeanne M. & Kim, Younjun, 2011. "Business Ownership by Workers: Are Worker Cooperatives a Viable Option?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 34575, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    15. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1993. "The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:1504. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marina Muilwijk). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/eiruunl.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.