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Ownership Dynamics and Firm Performance in an Emerging Economy: A Meta-Analysis of the Russian Literature

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  • Iwasaki, Ichiro
  • Mizobata, Satoshi
  • Muravyev, Alexander A.

Abstract

This paper provides a meta-analysis of studies on the effect of ownership on the performance of Russian firms over 20 years of rapid institutional and economic changes. We review 29 studies extracted from the EconLit and Web of Science databases with a total of 877 relevant estimates. We find that the government negatively affects company management regardless of its administrative level. In contrast, private ownership is positively associated with firm performance. The effect size and statistical significance are notably varied among different types of private ownership. While the effect of insider (employee and management) ownership is comparable to that of foreign investors, the effect of domestic outsider investors is considerably smaller. Our assessment of publication selection bias reveals that the existing literature does not contain genuine evidence for a series of ownership types and, therefore, some of the findings have certain limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • Iwasaki, Ichiro & Mizobata, Satoshi & Muravyev, Alexander A., 2017. "Ownership Dynamics and Firm Performance in an Emerging Economy: A Meta-Analysis of the Russian Literature," RRC Working Paper Series 65, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:rrcwps:65
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatization; Corporate Ownership; Firm Performance; Meta-analysis; Publication Selection Bias; Russia;

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
    • P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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