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Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • Guillermo Alves

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Gabriel Burdin

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Paula Carrasco

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Andrés Dean

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

  • Andrés Rius

    () (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economí­a)

Abstract

In this work we present the results of a recent survey thar covered the whole universe of Worker Cooperatives in Uruguay. In order to be able to evaluate the comparative performance of Worker Cooperatives the survey covered also a control group of conventional firms with similar size and sector composition. In line with previous empirical research and theoretical literature, we report significant differences between the two groups of firms in several aspects of economic behavior. Cooperatives in Uruguay exhibit lower variation in wage and employment levels over time and lower dispersion of wages among workers of the same firm. They have a lower proportion of workers performing supervision tasks, lower investment rates and are less capital-intensive than the control group. Within the cooperative universe, lower investment rates and capital intensity are positively related with worker-owners being older and with the inexistence of membership markets, or more generally, of any form of individually specified property rights. On the other hand, we report no relevant differences in innovation activities and propensity to cooperate with other firms. These results are discussed in the context of the existent theoretical and empirical literature about the relative economic performance of Worker Cooperatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillermo Alves & Gabriel Burdin & Paula Carrasco & Andrés Dean & Andrés Rius, 2012. "Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-14, Instituto de Economia - IECON.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-14-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastián Berazategui & Emilio Landinelli & Daniel Ramírez, 2013. "Una comparación del comportamiento innovador entre Cooperativas de Trabajo y Empresas Capitalistas en Uruguay," Documentos de Investigacion Estudiantil (students working papers) 13-02, Instituto de Economia - IECON.
    2. Burdín, Gabriel, 2012. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? Evidence from Uruguay," AICCON Working Papers 108-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
    3. Burdin, Gabriel, 2013. "Are Worker-Managed Firms Really More Likely to Fail?," IZA Discussion Papers 7412, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Gabriel Burdín, 2016. "Equality Under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker‐Managed Firms," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1372-1403, August.
    5. Gabriel Burdín, 2014. "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail Than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 67(1), pages 202-238, January.
    6. Alves, Guillermo & Burdín, Gabriel & Dean, Andrés, 2016. "Workplace democracy and job flows," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 258-271.
    7. Dean, Andrés, 2019. "Do successful worker-managed firms degenerate?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 317-329.
    8. repec:ulr:tpaper:dtm-02-13 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Worker cooperatives; Capitalist firms; Comparative analysis; Investment; Employment.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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