Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay
In this work we present the results of a recent survey thar covered the whole universe of Worker Cooperatives in Uruguay. In order to be able to evaluate the comparative performance of Worker Cooperatives the survey covered also a control group of conventional firms with similar size and sector composition. In line with previous empirical research and theoretical literature, we report significant differences between the two groups of firms in several aspects of economic behavior. Cooperatives in Uruguay exhibit lower variation in wage and employment levels over time and lower dispersion of wages among workers of the same firm. They have a lower proportion of workers performing supervision tasks, lower investment rates and are less capital-intensive than the control group. Within the cooperative universe, lower investment rates and capital intensity are positively related with worker-owners being older and with the inexistence of membership markets, or more generally, of any form of individually specified property rights. On the other hand, we report no relevant differences in innovation activities and propensity to cooperate with other firms. These results are discussed in the context of the existent theoretical and empirical literature about the relative economic performance of Worker Cooperatives.
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