Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies

The need to insure against idiosyncratic income risk leads to the formation of risksharing groups in village economies where formal financial markets are absent. We develop a theoretical model to address the impact of limited commitment and social control on the extent of informal risk-sharing when agents are induced to form such risk-sharing coalitions. Social control increases the prospect of the future punishment of present defectors and thus mitigates the absence of commitment. A defection-proof core-partition exists, is unique, and is homophilic. Riskier societies may not be more segmented and may not pay a higher cost for insurance. A higher social control leads to a less segmented society but does not necessarily lead to a lower price for sharing risk. We provide evidence, based on data on Thai villages, that consumption smoothing conforms with our theoretical result of homophily-based coalitions and that social control contributes to a lesser segmentation of a society.