Risk Sharing and Network Formation
Interpersonal relationships have long been suspected of shaping agrarian institutions, probably because weak formal institutions must be supplemented by interpersonal trust. This is particularly true for informal risk sharing, a fundamental risk coping mechanism for the rural poor (e.g. Mark R. Rosenzweig, 1988, Marcel Fafchamps, 1992, Stephen Coate and Martin Ravallion, 1993, Robert Townsend, 1994, Ethan Ligon et al., 2001, Andrew Foster and Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001).
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- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997.
"Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies,"
Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001)
97/08, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Oct 2000.
- Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P Thomas & Tim Worrall, 1997. "Informal Insurance Arrangements in Village Economies," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9705, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
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