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Group Size and the Efficiency of Informal Risk Sharing

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  • Emla Fitzsimons
  • Bansi Malde
  • Marcos Vera‐Hernández

Abstract

This paper studies the relationship between group size and informal risk sharing. It shows that under limited commitment with coalitional deviations, this relationship is theoretically ambiguous. It investigates this question empirically using data on sibship size of household heads and spouses from rural Malawi, exploiting a social norm among the main sample ethnic group to define the potential risk‐sharing group. We uncover evidence of worse risk sharing of crop losses in larger potential risk‐sharing groups, and rule out alternative explanations for the findings. A simple calibration exercise indicates that our empirical findings are consistent with the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Emla Fitzsimons & Bansi Malde & Marcos Vera‐Hernández, 2018. "Group Size and the Efficiency of Informal Risk Sharing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(612), pages 575-608, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:612:p:f575-f608
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12565
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    Cited by:

    1. Bansi Malde & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2022. "Spillovers of Community-Based Health Interventions on Consumption Smoothing," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(4), pages 1591-1629.
    2. Evans, Alecia & Sesmero, Juan, 2022. "Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Correlated Noisy Payoffs: Theory and Experimental Evidence," 2021 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Austin, Texas 322804, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Luigi Ventura & Maria Ventura, 2021. "Migration, diversity and regional risk sharing," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(44), pages 5090-5102, September.
    4. Putman, Daniel S., 2020. "The Scope of Risk Pooling," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304480, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    5. Shaoze Jin & Xiangping Jia & Harvey S. James, 2021. "Risk attitudes within farmer cooperative organizations: Evidence from China's fresh apple industry," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(2), pages 173-205, June.
    6. Tobias Broer & Tessa Bold, 2015. "Risk-Sharing in Village Economies Revisited," 2015 Meeting Papers 1232, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Daniel J. Hernandez & Fernando Jaramillo & Hubert Kempf & Fabien Moizeau & Thomas Vendryes, 2023. "Limited Commitment, Social Control and Risk-Sharing Coalitions in Village Economies," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 2023-03, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.

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